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 Internalizing externalities when there are significant private non-market rents  
 
Introduction 
Conservation easements are one of the most common tools for conducting land 
preservation.   Land remains in private ownership, but the landowner enters into a 
contractual agreement to place restrictions on development or use of the land.  Land that 
is privately owned but presents positive benefits to the public (such as open space or 
wildlife habitat) is an example of a positive externality. The classic model of externalities 
described by economists like Baumol and Oates (1998) is commonly used to explain the 
marginal social and private benefits provided by such environmental goods.  Using this 
classical approach, a landowner will not alter his/her land use unless the commercial rents 
for the “converted” land are greater than the rents from the original use (Geltner, 
Riddiough, and Stojanovich, 1996).  If the rents from development exceed agricultural 
use, a rational agent will convert the land into development.  
According to this traditional environmental model, a landowner will keep land in an 
undeveloped state to the point where private marginal benefits equal marginal costs.  
Therefore, a sub-optimal amount of land preservation will occur if the land presents 
social benefits that exceed private benefits, and the landowner is not compensated for this 
externality.  Thus, in theory, a conservation easement can be a successful policy tool if it 
provides financial compensation that bridges the gap between the private and social 
benefits.  The key to attaining social efficiency is most often linked to quantifying the gap 
between the private benefits curve and the social benefits curve, and ensuring that the 
financial benefits provided by the conservation easement are equal to this gap.  
Whether or not a conservation easement is necessary to maintain the land in an 
undeveloped state is determined by the commercial and non-market compensation that a 
landowner receives. 
 
In our study we conducted an iterative qualitative research process with 59 attendees 
(both landowners and land trusts) at the annual Land Trust Alliance Conference to 
identify social benefits provided by conservation land.  During the qualitative research 
process we found that landowners often place intrinsic value on land beyond the 
traditional commercial rents.  Thus, a private landowner may feel compelled to preserve 
the land from development, despite the fact that they may derive greater commercial rents 
from development.  This intrinsic value may be added to the social benefits curve, thus 
widening the difference between the private and social benefits curves. 
 
During the study we identified non-market rents that are important to private landowners; 
however, these rents have largely been ignored in the economic literature because private 
rents are a subset of public rents.  In our paper we graphically integrate several of these 
private and social values in the private and social benefit curves to make policy 
suggestions on how to make the market for conservation land more efficient 
 
Study Design 
In order to determine the social benefits provided by conservation land (or land protected 
by conservation easements), we implemented an iterative qualitative research process.  Although inductive and qualitative research is commonly used in disciplines such as 
anthropology, sociology, and psychology, this process remains relatively informal in 
economic research.  Utilizing qualitative research techniques utilized in an economic 
study of qualitative research by Johnston et al. (1995) and sociological qualitative 
research techniques presented by Lofland et al. (2006), we developed a formalized 
protocol to create a process for identifying social benefits provided by conservation land 
(Keske, 2006).   
 
Research subjects were selected from the 2005 Land Trust Alliance Conference attendee 
list in Madison, Wisconsin.  There were 59 attendees and the participation attendance 
was 78.85 percent.  Attendees held a number of positions in the land trust community, 
including attorneys, appraisers, land protection specialists, and executive directors.  One 
focus group also consisted of Midwestern landowners.  Table 1 presents a list of social 









    Table 1  Social Values in conservation Land 
                 
Wildlife habitat protection        
Biodiversity        
Natural  areas        
Proximity to other protected lands      
Connectivity to create synergy        
Ecosystems        
Prime, sustainable agricultural lands      
Public  access        
Working lands (forests, ag)        
Scenic  beauty        
Historic  lands        
Open  space        
Nature based recreation or activities      
Specific  landscapes        
     *Coastal terrace prairie        
     *Woodlands          
     *Farmland as a view        
Buffer to development and encroachment      
Cultural  uses        
Hunting  rights        
Preservation of family lands        
Spatial location of buildings or conservation values    
Educational  opportunities       
Privacy  or  solitude        
Wilderness        
W a t e r          
   In close proximity to water or recharge    
    Headwaters       
    Riparian  areas       
   Buffers to water        
    Wetlands        
   Public water supply        
   Water rights        
   Reduction of pollution (pollution treatment)    





 During the qualitative research process, a number of land trust participants (as well as 
landowners) articulated that landowners often sought to protect their land for personal or 
non-commercial reasons.  While land trusts acknowledged that many landowners seek to 
protect their land in part for financial compensation (in the form of federal, state, local, 
and estate tax benefits), nearly all participants agreed that landowners usually had a 
personal tie to their land or to their community’s sense of place that motivated them to 
preserve the land.  It is also worthwhile to note that usually this personal tie to the land 
involved the landowner foregoing compensation for preserving their land.   
 
Marshall (2002) and Hoag et al. (2005) define this foregone private rent as “private 
amenity rent” or PAR.  For example, several studies (Hoag et al., 2002; Elconin and 
Luzadis, 1998; Stewart and Libby, 1997; Rowe, Bartlett, and Swanson, 2001) found that 
personal attachment to the land was one of the, if not the primary, motivations for 
landowners to engage in land conservation.  McLaughlin (2004 p. 43) also cites a joint 
effort by the State University of New York and the University of Vermont.  
McLaughlin’s study noted that the landowner enacting the conservation easement was 
motivated to do so primarily as a result of their “personal attachment to their land, a sense 
of altruism, and a commitment to the stewardship of their land.”   
 
Protecting community heritage, or a community’s sense of place, is also a key motivation 
for landowners to preserve critical parcels of land.  While Section 170 of the IRS 
regulations mandate that conservation easements provide social value, landowners also 
are also intrinsically motivated to preserve land to maintain a sense of community (Keske, 2006).   A community’s sense of place is very closely tied to family heritage 
(Cross, 2001).  In a sense, by preserving a community’s sense of place, landowners are 
maintaining their own family heritage. 
 
Thus, although it is well-established that both communities and landowners glean social 
benefits from land conservation, it is also possible to over-compensate a landowner for 
his/her land.  That is, the landowner reservation price for land conservation may actually 
be lower than what society has paid the landowner.  Hence the market is still inefficient 
because society has overpaid the landowner for land protection. 
 
Therefore, the key to establishing an efficient market is to quantify the land’s private and 
social benefits (the former of which also includes the landowner intrinsic benefits).  Once 
these benefits are identified, for an efficient market to take place, landowner 
compensation should comprise the difference between the private benefits curve and the 
social benefits curve.  This way the landowner’s externality is internalized and an 
efficient amount of land protection takes place.  In this next section, we propose a model 
of how to develop an efficient market by disaggregating the private and social benefit 
curves to identify the proper amount of compensation a landowner should receive from a 




 Graphical Model 
Commercial Rents and Option Values 
Traditionally, landowner private benefits (or rents) are expressed as a function of both 
commercial rents and option values.  In the traditional environmental economics 
literature, commercial rents are the basic rents that comprise the marginal private benefits 
curve.  The appraisal literature provides guidance in determining the value of the rents 
when the development rights are unrestricted (Plantinga and Miller, 2001; Tegene, 
Weibe, and Kuhn,1999; Capozza and Sick, 1994; and Capozza and Helsley, 1989; 
Marshall, 2002).  The value of land with unrestricted development rights is expressed in 
price per acre. 
 
The option value is defined as the price of the undeveloped land, which is a function of 
all underlying stock rents, plus potential future temporal growth rate changes.  The option 
value can also be added to the marginal private benefits curve, and when a landowner 
enacts a conservation easement on her property, he/she essentially extinguishes the option 
to develop her land in the future.  
 
The landowner private benefits are illustrated in Figure 1.  In Figure 1 we break down the 







The Marginal Private Benefits of Land as a Function of Commercial Rents and Option 
Value of a Parcel of Undeveloped Land 
 




Referring back to Geltner, Riddiough, and Stojanovich, the landowner will keep land in 
its original use, and not convert the land to an alternative use, up to the point where the 
marginal benefits curve equals the marginal cost curve. This will result in an amount of 
undeveloped acreage equal to level AB*.    Should a landowner choose to place a 
conservation easement onto her land, this extinguishes future development options.  
Thus, she must receive financial compensation for the conservation easement equal the 
C  P A * 
MPBA
MPC 
P*A  = reservation price with 
commercial rents  
P*B = reservation price with 
commercial rents and option value  
MPBB  
   AA* AB* 
B
Acres Preserved 
P B * 
Value per Acre 
Where: 
 
 MPBA =   Commercial Rents  
  MPBB =   Commercial Rents + 
            Option Values  option value (distance between C and B), or there will be a sub-optimal amount of 
undeveloped land (AA*). 
 
The Land’s Social Value 
As previously stated, land qualifying for conservation easement tax benefits must provide 
social benefit.  Land that provides greater social benefit than private benefit yields a 
classic environmental economics externality graph (Baumol and Oates, 1998), presented 
in Figure 2.  For an efficient amount of undeveloped land, the landowner must receive 
compensation equal to the distance from B to D (the social values provided by the land), 
as well as compensation for the option value equal to distance C to B. The additional 
distance B to D occurs due to non-market values that are assumed be held by the public.  
This is a key assumption that we challenge later.  If a landowner’s reservation price can 
be determined, then the efficient amount of land will be allocated and the proper amount 
of compensation can be provided to the landowner.  Thus, we propose that the amount of 
social benefit provided by protected land may change the distance between the private 
and social benefits curves, as well as the amount of compensation due to the landowner 
for an efficient market to take place.  We now present private amenity rent (or PAR) as a 

























V*= reservation price for social 
value + private value 
P* = landowner reservation price 












 MPBA =   Commercial Rents Only 
  MPBB =   Commercial Rents + Option Values  Landowner Private Amenity Rent (PAR):  A Third Source of Rent 
We propose that landowner utility is one means by which the gap between the MPB and 
MSB curve can be narrowed.  The landowner’s PAR can be a large share of the total 
public non-market rents.   PAR is considered a non-consumptive rent that can be added to 
the MPB curve, in addition to the land’s “highest and best use” and option value.  Figure 
3 illustrates the addition of PAR to the MPB curve.  When PAR>0, the gap between the 
MPB curve and the MSB curve is clearly narrowed, which reduces the amount of the 
market failure, and closes the gap between the MSB and the MPB curves.  In other 
words, the “sense of place” that is provided by the land is also realized by the landowner, 
who is also part of society.  Thus, the landowner does not need to be compensated for this 
utility, or rent, that she already receives from the land. This can result in markedly 
improve market efficiency, illustrated in Figures 3.     
 Figure 3 
Market for Land Preservation, Adding PAR to the MPB Curve 
PAR>0 
  
(Measured in Acres of Land Preserved—or Undeveloped) 
Figure 3 presents the landowner’s marginal private benefits curve when it includes 
commercial rent, option value, and non-commercial rent (PAR).   When only commercial 
rent and option value are added to comprise the MPB curve, acreage will be preserved in 
the amount of AA*, and the landowner’s reservation price for converting the land for 
development will be at P*.  However, when PAR is also added to the marginal benefits 
curve, the landowner will preserve land equivalent to amount AB*´ and the reservation 



















 MPBA =   Commercial Rents Only 
  MPBB =   Commercial Rents + Option Values 
MPBC =   Commercial Rents + Option Values 
              + PAR
V*= reservation price for social 
value + private value 
P*´ = landowner reservation price 
for land with PAR, commercial 
rents and option value 
P*=landowner reservation price for 
land with only commercial rents 
and option value landowner is less likely to convert land for development.  Likewise, when social values 
provided by the land are factored into the equation, AC* and V* represent the socially 
optimal level of acreage and reservation price, respectively.  Although market distortion 
(the distance between Point D and Point E) is present, the gap between the MPB and 
MSB curves has clearly narrowed when PAR is added to the MPB curve, as the market 
distortion would otherwise equal the distance between B and D. 
 
Clearly, landowner PAR may impact the landowner’s land use decisions, by tipping the 
scale in favor of one land use over another, and PAR can explain why some landowners 
retain ownership of land (for agricultural use, for example), when the land should 
actually be designated for another use that garners higher financial rents.   Therefore, it 
would be in land trust’s best interest to have an understanding of the landowner PAR.  If 
the land trust is willing to pay price P*´ for a parcel of land but only has to pay P* due to 
the landowner’s PAR and thus lower reservation price, the trust may potentially 
“overpay” for a parcel of land in the amount equal to the distance between P* and P*´.
1   
 
There is also a significant policy twist when it comes to conservation easement practices.  
Regardless of the presence of landowner PAR, that there will still be a sub-optimal 
amount of preserved land, because the landowner is not fully compensated for the social 
benefits provided by her land due to policy failure in the IRS tax code .  Section 
170(h)(4) of the IRS Tax Code prohibits compensation for social values on conservation 
easement lands, despite the requirement of the presence of social values for a 
                                                 
1 It is worth noting that conservation organizations rarely actually “pay” for a conservation easement on a 
parcel of land.  Usually the conservation easement is donated.  Therefore, by “pay” we are actually 
referring to the financial compensation provided to landowners that are provided in the form of tax benefits. conservation easement to take place.  Thus, in light of this tax policy, referring again to 
Figure 3, a greater amount of land is preserved when PAR is taken into consideration 
than when it is not factored into the equation.  This is reflected in the distance between 
AC* and AB*.  Thus, the increase in landowner reservation price due to PAR may help 
the market edge closer to efficiency, because the gap between Point B and Point D has 
been narrowed.   
 
Thus, under the current rules and regulations, the market will not be efficient unless one 
of the following occurs:   
1)  A fee simple transaction (or outright purchase of the conservation land for 
preservation) in an amount equal to what the trust believes to reflect the 
difference between a landowner’s private benefits (including PAR) and the 
land’s social value. 
2)  Landowner PAR makes up the entire difference between the MSB and the 
MPB curves.     
 
With respect to the first point, under current appraisal regulations it may still be difficult 
for an appraiser to include these social values in a property appraisal.  Hence, policy 
failure exists for both the conservation easement and the appraisal regulations, and so 
another recommendation for improving market efficiency is to amend appraisal policy to 
include social values in part of the landowner compensation package.  Appraisals aside, 
Figure 3 makes it clear that landowner PAR has the potential to fully deliver market efficiency, when the landowner engages in an act of self-sacrifice to see that parcel 
preserved indefinitely. 
 
A situation may also arise in which the landowner has no private amenity rent from the 
land.  In this case, demonstrated in Figure 4, PAR=0, and the MPB is effectively a sum of 
the commercial rents and the option value, which looks very similar to Figure 2.  
However, in Figure 4 the market failure, represented by the distance between Point B and 
Point D, is greater than the market distortion presented in Figure 3, reflected in the 
distance between Point D and Point E.  This is because the landowner’s lack of PAR fails 
to bridge some of the gap between private and social benefits provided by the land, as it 
did in Figure 3.  Hence, the landowner’s reservation price for converting the land for 
development is lower when PAR=0, compared to when PAR>0.  In the former case the 
landowner is more likely to convert the land for development unless she receives full 
compensation equal to the distance between the MSB and MPBB curves.  In this case, in 
order to have an efficient amount of undeveloped land preserved, society must pay for the 
full difference between Point D and Point B, most likely as part of a fee simple 
transaction. 
 Figure 4 
Market for Land Preservation, Adding PAR to the MPB Curve 
PAR=0 
  
(Measured in Acres of Land Preserved—or Undeveloped) 
To address the second point, PAR may also result in an efficient market when the 
landowner’s PAR completely bridges the gap between the private and social benefit 
curves.  Here, the landowner reservation price is exactly equal to the social value 
garnered from the land.  By all accounts, this appears to be an efficient market, although 
technically, it is possible that the landowner’s utility from seeing the land remain 
undeveloped constitutes almost the entire social benefit of maintaining the land in an 





V*= reservation price for social 
value + private value 
P* = landowner reservation price 
for land with commercial rents, 











 MPBA =   Commercial Rents Only 
MPBB =   Commercial Rents + Option  
            Values + PAR=0 utility.  Such may be the case of an island of undeveloped land surrounded by 
commercial development that a landowner wants to see maintain as undeveloped.  In this 
situation it is conceivable that this island of open land should actually be converted to 
development (and the financial benefits be spent elsewhere preserving other potentially 














 Figure 5 
Market for Land Preservation, Adding PAR to the MPB Curve 
MPB=f(Commercial Rents, Option Value, PAR)=MSB 
  




In summary according to IRS tax codes, in order for land to qualify for a conservation 
easement, the land must provide social value.  However, policy failure actually occurs 
because landowners are not compensated for these social values.  The most obvious 
improvement to conservation easement policy is a revision of IRS appraisal values to 















 MPBA =   Commercial Rents Only 
  MPBB =   Commercial Rents + Option  
   V a l u e s  
MPBC =   Commercial Rents + Option 
 Values + PAR  
However, instead of launching a political war, another means for improving the 
efficiency of the conservation easement and land conservation market may be to 
construct an instrument to assist in the identification of landowner PAR.  As discussed, 
when the landowner PAR is included in the private benefits curve, the market may come 
closer to operating efficiently because the landowner reservation price for converting the 
land to another use becomes higher, and thus, the landowner is less likely to convert his 
land for development.  If conservation organizations could identify landowners with 
higher amounts of PAR, greater economic efficiency could be attained.  Likewise, 
without properly understanding a landowner’s PAR, it is possible that a conservation 
organization will overcompensate a landowner.  Research into and the development of 
such an instrument may be a worthwhile effort, for once land is converted into 
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